

5830  
6 May 2016

From: CAPT (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN  
To: Commander, Navy Region Southwest

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION OF THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES  
EMPLOYED AT NAVAL AIR STATION LEMOORE, CALIFORNIA AND THE  
BREACH OF SECURITY ON 30/31 MARCH 2016

Encl: (1) Appointing order ltr 5830 Ser N00/349 of 4 Apr 16  
(2) Request for extension ltr 5830 Ser N00J/319 of 12 Apr 16  
(3) Extension approval ltr 5830 Ser N00/372 of 18 Apr 16  
(4) Request for extension ltr 5830 Ser  
(5) Extension approval ltr 5830 Ser  
(6) Sworn statement of MASN (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 6 May 16  
(7) Sworn statement of CAPT (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 29 Apr 16  
(8) Sworn statement of MA2 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 5 May 16  
(9) Sworn statement of (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), of 26 Apr 16  
(10) Sworn statement of MAC (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 6 Apr 16  
(11) Summarized statement of MA3 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of  
(12) Sworn statement of (b)(6)&(b)(7), dated 13 Apr 16  
(13) Sworn statement of (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), of 25 Apr 16  
(14) Sworn statement of ACC (b)(6)&(b)(7), USN of 5 May 16  
(15) Sworn statement of MA1 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 27 Apr 16  
(16) Sworn statement of AO2 (b)(6)&(b)(7), USN of 5 May 16  
(17) Sworn statement of MA3 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 5 May 16  
(18) Sworn statement of CWO4 (b)(6)&(b)(7), USN of 26 Apr 16  
(19) Sworn statement of MA1 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 29 Apr 16  
(20) Sworn statement of MA1 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 4 May 16  
(21) Summarized statement of MA2 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of  
(22) Sworn statement of MA2 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 6 May 16  
(23) Sworn statement of MA2 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 5 May 16  
(24) Incident report of AC1 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C), USN of 30 Mar 16  
(25) Incident report of AC2 Andrew Marcet, USN of 30 Mar 16  
(26) Incident report of AC1 (b)(6)&(b)(7), USN of 30 Mar 16  
(27) Arrest-Investigation Report (CHP) of 5 Apr 16  
(28) Records Check (NCIS) Castillo, Anthony Raymond II of 1 Apr 16  
(29) Evidence Report (CHP) of 31 Mar 16  
(30) Vehicle Report (CHP) of 1 Apr 16  
(31) Record (DMV) of Castillo, Anthony Raymond II  
(32) Record (DMV) of Miller, Melissa Marie  
(33) Coroner First Call Report of Castillo, Anthony of 31 Mar 16  
(34) CHP Investigation Report (NCIS) of 7 Apr 16  
(35) Dash Camera Video (CHP) of 30-31 Mar 16  
(36) Helicopter (FLIR) Video/Audio (CHP) of 30-31 Mar 16

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- (37) RDC Event Data Compilation DVD (CHP) of 30-31 Mar 16
- (38) Detail with Caller Report (CHP) of 30 Mar 16
- (39) OPREP 3 NAVY BLUE (NASL) of 30 Mar 16
- (40) Narrative Supplement Report (CHP) of 30-31 Mar 16
- (41) Aerial Map CHP Pursuit Pathway (Google Maps) of 6 May 16
- (42) Aerial Map Post 1 to Enterprise and Reeves Bypass (Google Maps) of 6 May 16
- (43) Aerial Map Post 3 and Gateway Rd. (Google Maps) of 6 May 16
- (44) Aerial Map Post 3 JGC entrance to NASL (Google Maps) of 6 May 16
- (45) Commander, Navy Installations Command Map (NASL)
- (46) Aerial Map of Gate Runner Pathway (NASL) of 30-31 Mar 16
- (47) Trouble Ticket e-mail ltr for Post 3 of 31 Mar 16
- (48) Integrated Priority List (NASL) of 8 Oct 15
- (49) Weekly Training Report (NASL Ops) of 30-31 Mar 16
- (50) Bollard Deployment Records of 30 Mar 16
- (51) Watch Bill (NASL) of 30-31 Mar 16
- (52) Security Qualifications Review (NASL)
- (53) Security Fence Watch Bill of 30-31 Mar 16
- (54) Post 3 Logbook (NASL) of 26 Mar 16
- (55) CDO Logbook (NASL) of 30-31 Mar 16
- (56) SECO Training Muster Sheet (NASL) of 5 Feb 16
- (57) RAM Report (NASL) FY 2016
- (58) RAM Location Report (NASL) of 16 Mar 16
- (59) Bollard Check (NASL) of 30 Mar 16
- (60) Working Dog Inspections (NASL) of March 2016
- (61) UFC 4-002-01, Chapters 5 and 6, of 25 May 05
- (62) HHOA (NASL) of 10 Apr 16
- (63) SECO Training on Gate Runner of 5 Feb 16
- (64) AT/FP Observations and Recommendations (NASL) of 1 Mar 16
- (65) CS/SC 2016 HOTWASH (NASL) of 25 Feb 16
- (66) 2016 Annual Training Long & Short Range (NASL) FY 2016
- (67) Post 3 Photo, South/Night (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (68) Post 3 Photo, Cover/Day (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (69) Post 3 Photo, Cover/Night (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (70) Post 3 Photo, Cover Position (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (71) ESS Curves to Post 3 Photo (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (72) ECP Post 1 Photo (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (73) Post 1 Photo, Night (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (74) Post 1 Photo, Cover/Day (IO) of 6 Apr 16
- (75) OPNAVINST 5530.14E of 28 Jan 09
- (76) CNICINST 3502.2 of 8 Sep 15
- (77) CNICINST 5530.14A of 29 May 13
- (78) NASLEMINST 5500.1B of 7 Oct 13
- (79) U. S. Fleet Forces (USFF) Force Protection Directive (FPCON) Message 16-043
- (80) NTP 3-07.2.3 Appendix O of June 2009
- (81) SOP ECP Procedures 9015A (CNRSW) of 28 May 13

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- (82) SOP ECP Professionalism 4033 (CNRSW) of 8 Feb 13
- (83) FP SOP Barrier System Operations 90011A (CNRSW) of 28 May 13
- (84) Dispatch Center IOP Duties and Responsibilities OPS-Lemoore of 21 Jul 11
- (85) SOP Barrier System Operation P-08 (NASL) of 29 Jan 15
- (86) SOP Flight Line Security 0-14 (NASL) of 27 Jan 15
- (87) SOP Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) T-03 (NASL) of 24 Feb 15
- (88) PPR Police-08 (NASL)
- (89) Ready for Tasking Summary (CNRSW) of FY18
- (90) IPL Tasking e-mail (CNRSW) of 8 Jan 16

### Preliminary Statement

1. Per enclosure (1) Captain (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], conducted this command investigation of the force protection measures employed at Naval Air Station Lemoore, California (NASL) and the breach of security that occurred on 30 March 2016. As directed by Commander, Navy Region Southwest, the investigation set out to determine the baseline training, qualification, and physical security requirements of NASL prior to the incident and then turned its focus to the timeline of the incident from the initial unauthorized access (gate runner) until the threat was neutralized approximately 17 minutes later. Per enclosures (2) through (5), two requests for extension were requested and approved in order to support the collection of relevant evidence and statements. The investigation team only interviewed Department of Navy personnel. Information and evidence from local law enforcement was obtained through the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), which conducted a separate investigation, and the Region Dispatch Center. Lieutenant Commander (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], JAGC, USN, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Navy Region Southwest, and Legalman First Class (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], USN, also served as members of the investigation team to provide additional administrative and legal support.

2. Summary. At approximately 2338 Pacific Standard Time (PST), a 1997 purple Jeep Grand Cherokee (JGC), driven by a non-DoD affiliated civilian with a non-DoD affiliated civilian in the front passenger seat commenced fleeing from a California Highway Patrol (CHP) Patrol Unit approximately 10 miles from NASL Operations Side [see enclosure (46) for geographic reference]. At approximately 2340, the CHP Patrol Unit requested CHP Dispatch contact NASL regarding the possibility that the JGC may enter the base, since the pursuit was heading towards the NASL Administrative Side (Admin Side). CHP Dispatch was unsuccessful in contacting NASL due to an incorrect primary contact number being listed for NASL. The CHP Patrol Unit continued to pursue the JGC along Reeves Road, bypassing NASL Admin Side and continuing north towards NASL Operations Side. At approximately 2345, the JGC gained unauthorized access to NASL Operations Side (b)(7)(E)&(F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]. NASL was in Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Bravo (b)(7) [REDACTED]



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(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The CHP Patrol Unit approached the sentries, informed them of the pursuit, and was granted access to continue the pursuit. The cover sentry notified the Regional Dispatch Center (RDC) via Enterprise Land Mobile Radio System (ELMRS) of the gate runner (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

3. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The JGC proceeded to the north end of the Operations Side and then turned left and followed the perimeter security fence line around runway 32 Left, at one-point colliding with and damaging the fence line. The JGC sustained significant damage to the front end of the vehicle, to include its headlights. After finding no way out, the JGC crossed the Operations Side main compound, approached runway 32 Right and proceeded in the direction of the Combat Aircraft Loading Area (CALA) on the east side of runway 32 Right. At 0001:44, approximately 17 minutes after gaining unauthorized access, the JGC proceeded along the CALA towards four F-18 Hornets and struck the left horizontal stabilizer of the second F-18 Hornet it encountered. The horizontal stabilizer passed through the windshield on the right side of the JGC, damaging the horizontal stabilizer, immediately killing the passenger, and mortally wounding the driver. The JGC came to a stop in a field to the west of the CALA where the driver exited the vehicle and laid down in the field next to the JGC.

4. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A CHP helicopter equipped with an infrared camera



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was the only unit to have continuous visual contact on the JGC while it was within the boundaries of the Operations Side. A lack of direct communications between the CHP Helicopter and the NASL Naval Security Forces (NSF), combined with the lack of CHP's familiarity with the layout and nomenclature of NASL Operations Side, prevented an effective coordination of pursuit by the CHP and NASL NSF patrol units. (b)(7)(E)&(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. A thorough review of qualifications, training records, watch bills, standard operating procedures (SOPs), pre-planned responses (PPRs), and higher governing policies, directives and requirements was conducted. The NASL NSF personnel were fully trained and qualified to perform their duties and were adequately manned with the addition of Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) personnel provided by tenant commands. All ASF personnel on watch during the incident were fully trained and qualified to stand their duties as sentry. NASL implemented and met FPCON Bravo conditions at the time of the incident.

(b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

#### Findings of Fact

#### **Sequence of Events**

*Note: Times referenced in video enclosures indicate the run time from the start of the video file listed in the enclosure.*

1. On Wednesday, 30 March 2016, at approximately 2338, California High Patrol (CHP) Officer (b) and Officer (b)(6)&(b) (collectively CHP Patrol Unit) were driving southbound on SR-41 approaching Jackson Avenue in Lemoore, California. [Encl (40)]

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2. Officer (b) observed a vehicle, a purple 1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee (JGC), stopped on the westbound shoulder of Jackson Avenue and west of SR-41. [Encls (27), (31), (33), (40)]
3. The driver in the vehicle was Anthony Raymond Castillo II, age 29. [Encls (35), (37), (40)]
4. The passenger in the vehicle was Melissa Marie Miller, age 36. [Encls (27), (32), (33), (40)]
5. The CHP Patrol Unit turned west onto Jackson Avenue to check on the welfare of the occupants in the vehicle, and activated the patrol vehicle's spot light. [Encl (40)]
6. Ms. Miller told Mr. Castillo to "run" because he had outstanding warrants for his arrest and there was approximately 1 ounce of marijuana in the JGC. [Encls (28), (29), (34), (40)]
7. The JGC drove onto the westbound lane of Jackson Avenue and started weaving towards the white edge line for distances of 100 to 200 feet each time. [Encls (35), (40)]
8. The CHP Patrol Unit activated the emergency lights and siren, and advised CHP Dispatch that they were in pursuit of the JGC. [Encls (35), (40)]
9. The JGC continued westbound on Jackson Avenue approaching the Avenal Cutoff with speeds ranging from 65 MPH to 90 MPH. [Encls (35), (40)]
10. The JGC failed to stop for the sign at the intersection of Jackson Avenue and Avenal Cutoff, proceeded westbound against the flow of traffic on the eastbound SR-198 off ramp, briefly travelled westbound against the flow of traffic, and crossed the center median onto westbound SR-198. [Encls (35), (40), (41) ]
11. The CHP Patrol Unit discontinued pursuit and requested CHP Dispatch to notify NASL security that the JGC may attempt to enter the NASL front gate. [Encl (40)]
12. At approximately 2340, CHP Dispatch attempted to contact NASL by calling phone number, (b)(7)(E)&(F). The phone rang for approximately two minutes and twenty seconds. [Encls (13), (35), (37/CHP Phone Recordings)]
13. The phone number, (b)(7)(E)&(F). was associated with a NASL building that had been demolished approximately ten years prior. [Encls (13), (37/CHP Phone Recordings)]

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14. At approximately 2341, CHP Dispatch, made a second attempt to contact NASL by calling the phone number, (b)(7)(E)&(F). but received a busy signal because the call initiated at 2340 rang for approximately two minutes and twenty seconds.<sup>1</sup> [Encls (13), (37/CHP Phone Recordings)]

15. From SR-198, the JGC took the off ramp for NASL, and turned north onto Reeves Bypass. [Encls (35), (40), (41)]

16. Initiating a second pursuit of the JGC on westbound SR-198, the CHP Patrol Unit reactivated the emergency lights and siren as they turned on the off ramp for NASL. [Encls (35), (40)]

17. Post 1 is on the Admin Side of the NASL. [Encl (41)]

18. The JGC accelerated north on Reeves Bypass running a red light at the intersection of Reeves Bypass and Enterprise Avenue, the center of which is approximately 170 feet southeast of Post 1. [Encls (35),(40), (42), (72), (73)]

19. At Post 1, Master at Arms Second Class (MA2) (b)(6)&(b)(7) U.S. Navy, was standing duty (b)(7)(E)&(F). [Encls (11), (51)]

20. At Post 1, Master at Arms Third Class (MA3) (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) U.S. Navy, was standing duty (b)(7)(E)&(F). [Encl (17), (51)]

21. MA3 (b)(6)&(b) recalled a CHP Patrol Unit driving approximately 45 to 50 MPH on Reeves Bypass but did not think it was an unusual sight. [Encl (17)]

22. MA2 (b) recalled seeing a CHP Patrol Unit driving westbound on SR-198 but did not think it was an unusual sight. [Encl (11)]

23. The JGC, driving in excess of 100 MPH, proceeded northbound on Reeves Bypass, which merged onto Reeves Boulevard. [Encls (35), (40)]

24. CHP Patrol Unit requested CHP Dispatch to notify NASL security personnel that they were approaching NASL Gate 3, which is located on the Operations Side of NASL. [Encl (40)]

25. Operations Side is located approximately 5 miles from the Admin Side. [Encl (45)]

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<sup>1</sup> This was tested by the investigation team calling the number listed above, letting it ring, and calling the same number from another phone.



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26. At approximately 2343, CHP Dispatch made a third attempt to contact NASL by calling the phone number, (b)(7)(E)&(F). but received a busy signal because the call initiated at 2340 rang for approximately two minutes and twenty seconds. [Encls (13), (37/CHP Phone Recordings)]

27. The JGC continued to drive on Reeves Boulevard in excess of 100 MPH as it approached Gate 3. [Encls (35), (40)]

28. With lights and siren still activated, the CHP Patrol Unit started to slow and decrease its distance from the JGC because the CHP Patrol Unit was unsure about the NASL security protocol for a vehicle attempting to unlawfully gain access to the Operations Side. [Encls (35), (40)]

29. CHP Dispatch advised that it was still unable to contact NASL personnel. [Encl (40)]

30. At approximately 2344, CHP Dispatch contacted NASL Base Operations at the following number, (b)(7)(E)&(F). [Encls (37/CHP Phone Recordings), (40)]

31. NASL Base Operations [NFI] placed CHP Dispatch on hold. Approximately one minute and twenty seconds into the call, NASL Base Operations transferred CHP Dispatch to the Air Operations Duty Officer who was notified that a pursuit was headed toward the installation. [Encls (13), (37/CHP Phone Recordings)]

32. The JGC's tail lights were lit during the CHP pursuit to Post 3. [Encl (35 from 01:12 to 09:32)]

33. At approximately 2345, just prior to median strip leading to the intersection of Gateway Road and Reeves Boulevard, the Jeep drove northbound on the southbound lane of Reeves Boulevard leading towards the outbound lanes of Post 3, the main entrance to the Operations Side of NASL (b)(7)(E)&(F). [Encls (35 at 09:24), (40), (43)]

34. Master-at-Arms Seaman (MASN) (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). U.S. Navy, was standing duty (b)(7) at Post 3. [Encls (6), (51)]

35. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

36. Aviation Ordnanceman Second Class (AO2) (b)(6)&(b)(7), U.S. Navy, was standing duty (b) at Post 3. [Encls (16), (51)]

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37. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

38. There was steady flow traffic in and out of Gate 3 (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

39. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

40. Air operations, specifically Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) for one remaining aircraft, were ongoing at 2345. [Encls (24), (25), (26), (36 at 05:54)]

41. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

42. At approximately 2345, while scanning her field of view (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]x, MASN (b) [REDACTED] observed a car briefly stop on Gateway Road southeast of Post 3. [Encls (6), (43)]

43. At approximately 2345, MASN (b) [REDACTED] then turned her attention to Reeves Boulevard where she noticed a vehicle with activated emergency lights and sirens approaching the stop sign at the intersection of Gateway Road and Reeves Boulevard. [Encl (6)]

44. MASN (b) [REDACTED] stated to AO2 (b) [REDACTED] that a unit was approaching Gate 3. [Encl (16)]

45. At approximately 2345, AO2 (b) [REDACTED] observed the vehicle with emergency lights approaching Post 3 before the intersection of Reeves Boulevard and Gateway Road. [Encl (16)]

46. AO2 (b) [REDACTED] believed the approaching vehicle was a Navy Region Southwest vehicle and then a CHP vehicle when it reached the stop sign at the intersection of Reeves Boulevard and Gateway Road. [Encl (16)]

47. At approximately 2345, MASN (b) [REDACTED] and AO2 (b) [REDACTED] were now both standing immediately adjacent to Post 3 towards the inbound lane looking downrange toward the approaching CHP Patrol Unit. [Encl (35 at 09:47)]

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48. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

49. Approximately 17 seconds later, the CHP Patrol Unit drove through the inbound lane immediately adjacent to Post 3 and stopped briefly. [Encls (35 at 09:51), (40)].

50. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

51. The CHP Patrol Unit was granted access to NASL Operations Side to continue the pursuit, but lost contact on the JGC. [Encls (35 at 09:48), (40)]

52. At approximately 2345:27, MASN (b) [REDACTED] reported to Regional Dispatch Center (RDC) the following statement: "We have CHP onboard in high pursuit of a car that just come onboard headed towards the hangars." [Encls (6) (13), (37/Lemoore Police Recording, Part 1)]

53. At approximately or just prior to 2345, King's County Sheriff's Office (KCSO) contacted MA1 (b) [REDACTED] the Watch Commander, on the office phone to inquire whether NASL was aware of CHP's pursuit of a vehicle that was approaching the installation. [Encl (19), (37/Lemoore Police Recording, Part 1)]

54. At approximately 2345:51, MA1 (b) [REDACTED] notified RDC of a KSCO telephone call warning that CHP was in pursuit of a Blue Jeep Grand Cherokee on Grangeville Bypass headed towards the installation. [Encl (13)]

55. RDC instructed MA1 (b) [REDACTED] to have direct communications with Post 3. [Encl (13)]

56. At approximately 2346, the FLR passed the JGC heading in the opposite direction on the Reeves Road underpasses with headlights turned off. [Encl (21)]

57. The FLR was unable to quickly turn around on Reeves Road to pursue the JGC due to the constrained boundaries of the Reeves Road underpasses. [Encl (21)]

58. At approximately 2347, MA1 (b) [REDACTED] confirmed with MASN (b) [REDACTED] that CHP had already entered Gate 3 while pursuing the subject vehicle. [Encls (6), (13)]



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59. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

60. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

61. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

62. The JGC proceeded to the north end of the Operations Side and then turned left and followed the perimeter security fence line around runway 32 Left, at one-point colliding with and damaging the fence line. [Encls (35 at 16:48), (36), (40), (41), (46)]

63. The JGC sustained significant damage to the front end of the vehicle, to include its headlights. [Encls (30), (35 at 18:19)]

64. At approximately 2350, the CHP Patrol Unit briefly glimpsed red lights thought to be coming from the JGC at the west end of the Operations Side and continued pursuit around the perimeter of runway 32 L. [Encls (35 at 15:30), (40)]

65. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

66. A CHP helicopter equipped with a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) acquired camera was the only unit to have continuous visual contact on the JGC after it reached the northern end of the Operations Side. [Encl (36)]

67. After finding no way out, the JGC crossed the Operations Side main compound, approached runway 32 Right and proceeded in the direction of the (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] east side of runway 32 Right. [Encl (36), (46)]

68. At 0001:44 on 31 MAR 2016, approximately 17 minutes after gaining unauthorized access, the JGC proceeded (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED] towards four F-18 Hornets and struck the left horizontal stabilizer of the second F-18 Hornet it encountered. [Encl (36)]



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(b)(7)(E)&(F)

**Watch Bill**

82. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

83. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

84. Master at Arms First Class (MA1) (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). U.S. Navy, was the Watch Commander on 30 March 2016. [Encls (19), (51)]

85. All designated watch stations were assigned to fully qualified watch standers for 30 and 31 March 2016. [Encls (51), (52)]

86. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

87. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

(b)(7)(E)&(F).

89. Watch bills are created by the sectional Watch Commander and emailed to the Operations Chief Petty Officer, MAC (b)(6). [Encl (10)]

90. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

91. MA1 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) was assigned as the Duty Armorer for Bravo Section and is also qualified Watch Commander. [Encls (15), (51), (52)]

92. MA1 (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) was authorized to return to his place of residence so that he could get some sleep prior to conducting check-in interviews the next morning. [Encl (15)]



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93. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### **Manning**

94. CWO-4 (b)(6)&(b)(7) is the NASL Security Officer (SECO). [Encl (18)]

95. MAC (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) is the NASL Assistant Security Officer (ASECO). [Encl (10)]

96. Mr. (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C) is the NASL Physical Security Specialist and Antiterrorism Officer (ATO). [Encl (9)]

97. Ms. (b)(6)&(b)(7) is the NASL Physical Security Officer. [Encl (12)]

98. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

99. NASL is able to sustain a 4 section watch rotation with supplemental watch support from ASF personnel. [Encl (51)]

100. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### **Training and Qualifications**

102. CNICINST 3502.2, Navy Security Force Shore Training Manual, is the governing document for NSF training as ashore commands. [Encl (76)]

103. NASL has current and approved short and long range training plans IAW CNICINST 3502.2. [Encl (66)]

104. All personnel on watch during the gate runner incident were fully qualified IAW CNICINST 3502.2 for the watch stations they were assigned. [Encls (51), (52)]

105. MA1 (b)(6)&(b) is the NASL NSF Training Petty Officer. [Encl (20)]

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106. NASL conducts daily guard mount training with each watch section in accordance with an integrated short-range and long-range training plan. [Encl (49)]

107. The daily guard mount training periodically covers gate runner and unauthorized access topics. [Encl (49)]

108. The Security Officer conducted situational training on gate runner and unauthorized access with the entire Security Department on 05 FEB 2016. [Encl (63)]

109. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

110. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

111. [REDACTED] (b) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
(7)

112. All training and qualification records reviewed had not been reviewed on a quarterly basis for the previous two quarters. [Encl (52)]

### **Physical Security Posture**

113. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-022-01, SECURITY ENGINEERING: ENTRY CONTROL FACILITIES / ACCESS CONTROL POINTS, defines the construction and layout of ECPs. [Encl (61)]

114. FPCON B was in effect as directed by COMUSFLTFORCOM 121900Z FEB 2016, USFF Force Protection Directive Message. [Encl (79)]

115. Random Antiterrorism Measures were being employed at NASL in accordance with COMUSFLTFORCOM 121900Z FEB 2016, USFF Force Protection Directive Message. [Encls (57), (58), (60)]

116. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

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117. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

118. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

119. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

120. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

121. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

123. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



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130. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

133. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

138. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

142. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

144. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

146. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

(b)(7)(E)&(F).

152. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

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153. (b)(7)(E)&(F).  
[REDACTED]

154. On 10 APR 2015, a Higher Headquarters Operational Assessment assessed NASL as effective in all areas and that the installations policies and practices were aligned with Higher Headquarters Policies. [Encl (62)]

#### **Communications with State and Local Agencies**

155. Regional Dispatch Center (RDC) Navy Region Southwest Installation Operating Procedure (IOP) OPS-Lemoore01 promulgates the RDC duties and responsibilities to NASL with respect to receiving emergency telephone calls and subsequent dispatch efforts. [Encl (84)]

156. CHP dispatch had the wrong telephone number listed as the primary contact number for NASL and (b)(7)(E)&(F). which was a non-working number for NASL. [Encl (13)]

157. There is no record of verification for the primary contact numbers of all installations within the Navy Region Southwest area of responsibility prior to 30 MAR 2016. [Encl (13)]

158. At approximately 2345 on 30 MAR 2016, Kings County Sheriff's Department called MA1 (b) the Bravo Section Watch Commander, asking if he was aware of the pursuit by CHP. [Encl (18)]

159. (b)(7)(E)&(F).  
[REDACTED]

160. Various face-to-face communications occurred between NASL NSF and CHP during the course of the gate runner incident on 30 MAR 2016. [Encls (6), (8), (14), (16), (19), (21), (40)]

161. (b)(7)(E)&(F).  
[REDACTED]

162. The Federal Fire Department responders set up an Incident Command Post in the vicinity of the stopped JGC to facilitate medical response. [Encl (19)]

163. The CHP helicopter established communications with the NASL Air Traffic Control Tower. [Encls (24), (25), (26), (38)]



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### Current Policies and Applicable Instructions

164. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED]  
(7) [REDACTED]  
(E) [REDACTED]  
(F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(b) [REDACTED]  
(7) [REDACTED]  
(E)& [REDACTED]  
(F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

176. Commander Navy Region Southwest (CNRSW) N3AT SOP 9015a, Entry Control Point Procedures in NRSW, is listed as an active SOP for NASL NSF. [Encl (81)]

177. Commander Navy Region Southwest (CNRSW) SOP 9001a, Active and Passive Barrier System Operations and Testing, is listed as an active SOP for NASL NSF. [Encl (83)]

(b) [REDACTED]  
(7) [REDACTED]  
(E)& [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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185. (b)(7)(E)&(F)

#### Opinions

#### **Sequence of Events**

1. The gate runner incident of 30 MAR 2016 at NASL was not an act of terrorism; it was an unfortunate turn of events that ended with a vehicular accident that resulted in the death of two non-Department of Defense affiliated civilians and damage to an F-18 Hornet. [FF (1) – (81)]

(b)(7)(E)&(F).

3. While the sentries at Post 1 both observed a CHP Patrol Unit driving north past the post on public roads, neither one of them believed it was an unusual occurrence nor posed a risk to NASL. As a result of this belief, they continued to process inbound vehicles at Post 1 and did not notify Post 3 or the Watch Commander of their observation. [FF (18)-(22)]

4. Based on the CHP Patrol Unit's dashboard video, it is likely that the JGC had its lights on at the time of the unauthorized access as evidenced by the tail lights of the JGC remaining on throughout the pursuit. The combination of steady outbound traffic flow from Post 3, the dimly lit approaches to Post 3, the tracking of an inbound vehicle, the speed of the inbound JGC, (b)

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(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

5. While night time flight operations were occurring at the time of the gate runner incident, there were no aircraft in the immediate vicinity of Post 3 at the time of the unauthorized access, which means background noise was limited to ambient noise and that of vehicles entering and exiting the Operations Side through Post 3. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

6. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

7. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

The loss of contact with the JGC created a significant amount of confusion between CHP and NASL NSF as to the whereabouts of the JGC. [FF (38), (42)-(47), (49), (51), (56)-(61), (64)-(68), (156)-(161)]

8. With the loss of contact on the JGC, it was extremely difficult for the CHP Patrol Unit, the Flight Line Rover and Patrol Unit 3 to locate, intercept, and detain the JGC in the darkness of the night in an area of over 7,000 acres with nearly 15 miles of perimeter. [FF (64)-(68)]

9. The lack of a direct communications link between the CHP helicopter, CHP Patrol Unit, and the NSF Patrol Unit contributed to the difficulty in locating the JGC within the boundaries of the Operations Side. Contributing to this lack of coordinated communications is the fact that RDC did not have telephone communications with CHP Dispatch until 6 minutes after the JGC hit the F-18 Hornet. [FF (73), (159)]

### **Training and Qualifications**

10. NASL NSF has an effective training and qualification program that meets the requirements of CNICINST 3502.2. All personnel on watch during the gate runner incident on 30 MAR 2016 were fully trained and qualified for the watch stations they were assigned and were capable of preventing or deterring a gate runner incident. [FF (102)-(108)]



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11. NASL NSF conducts daily guard mount training for all NSF and ASF personnel that encompasses predetermined topics, recent lessons learned, and watch standing requirements. These daily training sessions are effective in ensuring the watch sections are aligned with the overall security priorities of NASL. [FF (106), (107)]

12. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

13. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

14. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

**Watch Bill and Manning**

15. NASL has the necessary supervisory personnel to manage the law enforcement, physical security, and AT/FP missions tasked to an installation. [FF (94)-(97)]

16. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

17. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

18. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

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19. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

20. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

#### Physical Security Posture

21. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

24. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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25. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

27. As evidenced in the results of the APR 2015 Higher Headquarters Operational Assessment, the SECO and the NASL NSF were fully immersed and engaged in maintaining the integrity of the physical security of NASL. [FF (152), (154)]

28. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

29. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

30. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

31. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

**Communications with State and Local Agencies**

32. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

33. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

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34. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Current Policies and Applicable Instructions**

37. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

38. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]



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41. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

43. NASL NSF department has all of the necessary instructions, policies, procedures and regulations in place to effectively execute security, law enforcement and Antiterrorism/Force Protection measures against a gate runner. [FF (102), (171)-(174), (176), (177), (182)-(188)]

44. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

**Gate Security SOPs WRT Final Denial Barriers**

46. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

**Additional Opinions**

49. The Commanding Officer, Captain (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). has a firm knowledge of security requirements and continually assesses his installation's capability to meet security and AT/FP

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requirements. Captain (b)(6)&(b) plays an active role in leading NASL NSF and has demonstrated keen judgment and insight into the security practices of NASL. Captain (b)(6)&(b) appropriately responded to the gate runner incident of 30 MAR 2016 after he was notified of the incident and effectively managed the installation's recovery and reporting requirements. [FF (76)-(80), (154)]

50. The Security Officer (SECO), CWO-4 (b), is an experienced leader in the field of security and ably leads the NASL Security Department. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Recommendations

**CNIC Enterprise**

1. Recommend all CNIC Dispatch Centers immediately develop a comprehensive list of all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, emergency services organizations, and emergency management organizations that support associated CNIC installations and validate every primary contact number. Once the list and contact numbers are validated with two-way communications, the list should be verified every 3 to 6 months to ensure its integrity.

2. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

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(b)(7)(E)&(F).

10. Recommend an assessment of the Mission Profile Validation – Protection (MPV-P) for all installations to ensure the installations and NSF are being provided adequate manpower,

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resources, and physical security equipment/systems to respond to worst case scenario threats with sufficient on-watch personnel and equipment in order to neutralize an escalating threat within the boundaries of the installation.

11. Recommend all installations assess the effectiveness of their ASF continuing training program. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NASL

15. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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19. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

21. Recommend NASL formalize the watch bill generation, approval, and modification process to ensure supervisors are involved in assessing the effectiveness and executability of the watch bill.

22. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

#### Fault, Neglect, or Responsibility

(b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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28. (b)(7)(E)&(F). [REDACTED]

(b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). [REDACTED]

(b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). [REDACTED]